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Abstract: Studies of political favouritism in Africa often treat ethnic and regional favouritism as 
interchangeable concepts. The present paper distinguishes between the two and investigates their 
relative influence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Focusing on whether individuals perceive their ethnic 
group to be unfairly treated by government, we assess the importance of being a co-ethnic of the 
country president, of living in the president’s region of origin and of the regional share of president 
co-ethnics. Empirical findings drawing on detailed individual level survey data covering more than 
19 000 respondents across 15 African countries suggest that ethnic and regional favouritism are 
not the same, but rather have independent effects.  
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1 Introduction 
 
In 1983, the Ivorian president Félix Houphouët-Boigny made his birthplace Yamoussoukro 
the national capital. At the time little more than an agricultural village, it was soon a city 
complete with an artificial lake with crocodiles, a six-lane highway, a five-star hotel, an 
airport that could land a Concorde, and most notably, the world's largest church built at a cost 
of 300 million USD (Rice, 2008). Equally excessive, president Mobutu turned his small 
Zairean home village of Gbadolite into a luxurious city often nicknamed ‘Versailles of the 
jungle.’ The village was equipped with several large palaces, the second of two African 
airports capable of landing Concordes, and a hydroelectric dam ensuring the country's best 
supply of water and electricity (see e.g. Meredith, 2005).  
These cases, while extreme, illustrate the widespread belief that African policy-makers 
tend to favour their own homelands and ethnic groups in the allocation of public funds, and 
the idea that African politics is heavily influenced by particularised loyalties (for a discussion, 
see e.g. Lindberg and Morrison, 2008). A small but growing literature evaluates the role of 
ethno-regional favouritism in African politics. Focusing on Kenya, the results of Kramon and 
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Posner (2012) suggest that having a co-ethnic as president or minister of education during 
one’s primary school years is associated with significantly better educational outcomes. 
Similarly, Burgess et al. (2013) find that Kenyan road investments are disproportionately 
allocated to the presidents’ district of birth and those regions where their ethnicity is 
dominant. For wider samples of countries, the results of Franck and Rainer (2012) suggest 
widespread effects of ethnic favouritism on educational outcomes and infant mortality, and 
Hodler and Raschky (2011) find that a disproportionate share of foreign aid ends up in the 
birth region of the political leader. On the other hand, the findings of Kasara (2007) indicate 
that African leaders tax the crops grown in their own ethnic homelands more heavily, and, 
studying a sudden change in the presidency in Guinea, Kudamatsu (2009) finds that a new 
ethnic group coming to power did not affect the relative levels of infant mortality among the 
country’s ethnic groups. 
Some of these studies focus on the effects of belonging to the same ethnic group as the 
top political leaders (Franck and Rainer, 2012; Kramon and Posner, 2012; Kudamatsu, 2009). 
Others use regionally based measures, considering the effects of living in the ethnic 
homelands of the political leadership (Burgess et al., 2013; Hodler and Raschky, 2011; 
Kasara, 2007). Irrespective of measure used, the results are often interpreted either in terms of 
ethnic favouritism or as ethno-regional favouritism. The close connection made between 
ethnic and regional favouritism rests on the assumption that, in the African context, the region 
and ethnic identity of inhabitants tend to coincide for historical reasons. In the past, ethnic 
groups were often differentiated from each other based on their practices to exploit their 
natural environment, and colonial rulers often created internal administrative boundaries 
around ‘tribes’ (Kasara, 2007).  
While we do not dispute this fact, the overlap between region of residence and ethnic 
affiliation raises interesting questions about their relative importance for who the subject of 
potential favouritism is. In the present paper, we distinguish between ethnic and regional 
favouritism and investigate their relative influence in Sub-Saharan Africa using detailed 
individual level survey data covering over 19 000 respondents from 15 African countries. 
Focusing on whether individuals perceive their ethnic group to be unfairly treated by the 
government, we assess the importance of three factors: being a co-ethnic of the country 
president, living in the president’s region of origin and regional share of the president’s co-
ethnics.  
 
  
2 Data and empirical setup 
 
We draw on detailed individual level survey data from the Afrobarometer (2013).
1
 Asking 
respondents about their ethnic group affiliations and the government’s treatment of their 
group, the data material is uniquely suited to study experiences with ethno-regional 
favouritism in a large African multi-country sample. Using this data, we estimate the 
following linear probability specification: 
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Our dependent variable,        , is a dummy taking the value one if the respondent answers 
‘sometimes’, ‘often’ or ‘always’ (and zero if the answer is ‘never’) to the question of how 
often their ethnic group is treated unfairly by the government. As can be seen in Table 1, 
approximately half of the sample fall into this category. Whether individual i perceives that 
his/her group is treated unfairly by the government is taken to depend on our three main 
factors of interest, explained below, and a vector of control variables   that includes country 
fixed effects, regional controls and individual-level socio-demographic indicators. The robust 
standard errors   are clustered at the region level. 
Our three explanatory variables of main interest combine information on self-reported 
ethnic group affiliation and region of residence of respondents with external data on the ethnic 
affiliations and regions of origin of heads of government in office at the time of the survey. 
First, we consider a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent belongs to the same 
ethnic group as the country’s president (Co-ethnic with the president). Considering that 
African politics tends to be highly centralised around the head of government and that the 
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 We use the third round of the survey, conducted in 2005-2006. The countries included are Benin, Botswana, 
Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Out of the 18 countries covered in the third round of the Afrobarometer, three 
are not in our sample. Cape Verde is excluded since respondents do not report any ethnic group affiliations. 
Furthermore, we were unable to match the ethnicity of the president in Lesotho to answers in the Afrobarometer 
data (the president is generally referred to as Sotho, while respondents give more nuanced answers, possible 
more akin to tribes within an ethnic group). And finally, the question that gives us our dependent variable is not 
asked in Zimbabwe. For more information about the Afrobarometer sampling procedures and survey methods, 
see Bratton et al. (2005). 
ethnic group of the president is often thought to be most favoured and politically dominant 
(see the discussion in Franck and Rainer, 2012), this measure should be relevant. Second, we 
consider the share of president co-ethnics in the respondent’s region2 (Regional share of 
president co-ethnics), and third, we construct a dummy variable indicating whether the 
respondent lives in the president’s region of origin (In the president’s homeland). In the full 
sample, 21 percent of the respondents belong to the same ethnic group as their president and 
17 percent live in their president’s region of origin (Table 1). The cross-sectional data at hand 
does not allow us to draw conclusions on the causal effects of ethnic and regional favouritism; 
for this purpose we would need to explore time variation in our dependent variable resulting 
from (preferably exogenous) changes in the countries’ presidency. What we can do, however, 
is consider whether ethnic and regional favouritism exist in parallel or whether the effect of 
one clearly dominates that of the other. 
 
3 Results 
Tables 2 and 3 provide a preview of our results. First of all, looking at the correlations in 
Table 2, we can note that while there is a clear positive correlation between living in the 
president’s homeland and being a co-ethnic of the president, it is by no means perfect (the 
correlation coefficient is 0.3). That is, co-ethnics of the president do not necessarily live in the 
president’s homeland, and residents in the president’s homeland are not necessarily his/her 
co-ethnics. Furthermore, the correlations presented in Table 2 show that being a co-ethnic 
with the country president, living in the president’s region of origin and living in a region with 
a large share of president co-ethnics are all negatively related with the perception that one’s 
group is unfairly treated by the government. The same pattern is visible when we compare 
average responses along the regional and ethnic dimensions (Table 3). Compared with people 
part of other ethnic groups, the president’s co-ethnics are 15 percentage points less likely to 
perceive that their ethnic group is unfairly treated by government. This difference is smaller if 
we look separately at regions that are the president’s homeland, yet still sizeable. We see an 
equally drastic difference between those who live in the president’s region of origin and those 
who live in other regions (18 percentage points). Also individuals who are not the president’s 
co-ethnics seem to fare considerably better if they live in the president’s homeland. 
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 The regions refer to the first-order administrative division in a country, in the data codebook denoted ‘province 
or region’. To construct the regional population shares, we use the sample weights supplied by the 
Afrobarometer. 
Seemingly then, there is not only favouritism between members of different ethnic groups, but 
also between different regions. 
Table 4 presents the results of our estimations (for details on the included control 
variables, see table notes). Looking at Columns 1-3, where our three key indicators are 
included separately, we can note that the results we get when controlling for country variation 
and individual socio-demographic characteristics are in line with the pattern observed in the 
simple correlations and comparisons of group means above. That is, individuals who are co-
ethnics with the country president, live in the president’s homeland or live in a region with a 
relatively large share of president co-ethnics are less likely to report that their group is 
unfairly treated by government. For president co-ethnics versus non-co-ethnics and residents 
of the president’s homeland versus residents of other regions, the reported differences in 
unfair treatment are 11 and 14 percentage points, respectively. Correspondingly, a one 
standard deviation (0.29) lower share of the president co-ethnics in the region is associated 
with a roughly six percentage point higher probability that a respondent reports that his/her 
group is treated unfairly.  
To investigate the relative importance of our three key indicators, we include them 
jointly, in steps. The results give no indication that the effect of one of the indicators 
completely dominates those of the others. Rather, it seems that they have distinct effects and 
thus that they are all relevant to consider. While the size of the coefficients shrinks in absolute 
terms, all three key indicators are still negatively related to unfair treatment. Conditioning on 
the regional share of the president’s co-ethnics, being a co-ethnic with the president still 
matters, and vice versa (Column 4). Similarly, conditioning on living in the president’s 
homeland, being a co-ethnic with the president is still negatively related to unfair treatment, 
and vice versa (Column 5). Including all three indicators jointly (Column 6), the coefficients 
become somewhat less precisely estimated, but still remain statistically significant at 
conventional levels. For instance, even when controlling for whether the respondent is a co-
ethnic with the president and for the share of the president’s co-ethnics, respondents living in 
the homeland of the president are still less likely than people from other regions to report that 
their group is treated unfairly. 
We take these results as an indication that ethnic and regional favouritism exist in 
parallel. Being a co-ethnic with the president, an individual is less likely to be treated unfairly 
by government, irrespective of where he or she lives. Similarly, however, an individual living 
in the president’s homeland or in a region with a large share of the president’s co-ethnics is, 
irrespective of his/her ethnic affiliation, less likely to be treated unfairly.  
In Columns 7-12, we include a range of additional controls that are potentially 
problematic in terms of endogeneity, but still interesting for our purposes. Controlling for 
ethnic salience and inter-ethnic and co-ethnic trust (Columns 7-9) – factors that might affect 
the perception of unfair treatment, but that may also be affected by unfair treatment – the 
results remain unchanged. Next, we include regional controls for economic standing and local 
controls for public goods (Columns 10-12), variables which could affect whether respondents 
perceive their group as unfairly treated while, again, also being potential outcomes of unfair 
treatment. The estimate that remains most stable and precisely estimated in the face of these 
controls is that of being a co-ethnic of the president. This makes sense. The literature has 
found that ethnic favouritism targeted regionally involves the provision of public goods and 
services such as roads, schools and hospitals. Controlling for local public goods, we should 
thus expect the estimates of our key regional factors to shrink. Conditioning on these regional 
indicators, there should still, however, be room for individually targeted ethnically based 
favouritism, e.g. in the form of appointment of jobs in the civil service. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Our findings demonstrate that ethnic and regional favouritism have distinct effects that exist 
in parallel, and that it is therefore meaningful to make a distinction between the two. While 
geographical clustering of ethnic groups means that co-ethnics of the president tend to be 
over-represented in the president’s homeland, interpreting benefits targeted to the president’s 
region of origin as ethnic favouritism (or vice versa), as has occasionally been done in the 
literature on ethno-regional favouritism, risks overlooking  important nuances. Rather, our 
results suggest that co-ethnics of the president receive benefits, irrespective of where they 
live. As do people living in the president’s homeland or in a region with a large share of 
president co-ethnics, regardless of their ethnic affiliation. Further research is needed to better 
understand who is targeted by political favouritism in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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 Table 1: Summary statistics 
     
  N Mean St.dev. Min. Max 
      Unfair 19,642 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Co-ethnic with the president 19,642 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Regional share of the president's co-ethnics 19,642 0.21 0.29 0 1 
In president's homeland 19,642 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Notes: Sample weights are not considered. 
      
 
Table 2: Correlations 
    
    1 2 3 4 
      1. Unfair 1 
   
      2. Co-ethnic with the president -0.13 1 
  
  
(0.00) 
   3. Regional share of the president's co-ethnics -0.14 0.72 1 
 
  
(0.00) (0.00) 
  4. In president's homeland -0.14 0.30 0.41 1 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Notes: The table presents correlations (p-values in parentheses) using 19 642 observations. 
 
 
Table 3: Averages of Unfair and t-tests of differences in averages 
    
                  t-test of 
    
Co-ethnic with the president 
 
difference 
  
All Yes No Difference (p-value) 
    Mean (N) Mean (N) Mean (N)     
          All 
 
0.52 (19,642) 0.39 (4,116) 0.55 (15,526) -0.15 0.00 
          In president's homeland Yes 0.36 (3,335) 0.34 (1,608) 0.39 (1,727) -0.05 0.00 
 
No 0.55 (16,307) 0.43 (2,508) 0.57 (13,799) -0.14 0.00 
Difference 
 
-0.18 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.18 
   t-test of difference (p-value)   0.00   0.00   0.00       
Notes: Sample weights are not considered. 
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Table 4: Ethnic or regional favouritism? 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
 
Dependent variable: Unfair 
         
             Co-ethnic with the president -0.11*** 
  
-0.05*** -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.06** -0.04** 
 
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Regional share of the president's co-ethnics 
 
-0.19*** 
 
-0.15*** 
 
-0.08* -0.14*** 
 
-0.08* -0.09* 
 
-0.04 
  
(0.05) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.05) (0.05) 
 
(0.05) (0.05) 
 
(0.05) 
In president's homeland 
  
-0.14*** 
 
-0.11*** -0.09** 
 
-0.10** -0.09** 
 
-0.08* -0.07 
   
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.04) (0.05) 
             Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual-level controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Ethnic attitude controls N N N N N N Y Y Y N N N 
Regional development indicators N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y 
Local public goods indicators N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y 
             Observations 19,183 19,183 19,183 19,183 19,183 19,183 18,792 18,792 18,792 17,437 17,437 17,437 
Number of regions 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 176 176 176 
Notes: Estimated with OLS. Robust standard errors, clustered by region, in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p-values below 1, 5, or 10.The individual-level control variables include the log of 
age in years, a female dummy, an urban dummy, dummies for highest level of education attained being at primary, secondary or post-secondary level, dummies for being Christian, Muslim or of 
other religion, a dummy for having full-time employment, the number of basic human needs (food, water, medicine, or cooking fuel) the respondent or his/her family has gone without at least 
once the past year, and the number of expensive items (car, motorcycle, bicycle, or TV) that the respondents owns. The ethnic attitude controls include a dummy for having a stronger 
attachment to one's ethnic group than to one's nationality, and two variables that indicate the extent of trust one has towards members of one's own group, and towards members of other 
groups, both ranging from 0 for `not at all' to 3 for `a lot'. The regional development indicators are the regional averages of the number of basic human needs not met and the number of 
expensive items owned, weighted by sample weights. The local public goods indicators are dummies indicating the presence of a post office, a school, a police station, an electricity grid, piped 
water, a sewage system, a health clinic, a recreational facility, a place of worship, a community building and market stalls in the enumeration area. 
 
